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Introduction
Deadly encounters of people of color with law enforcement regularly
make the national news. Just in recent memory, the string of deaths of
young African American men at the hands of police officers, which led
to civil unrest in cities across the United States, has attracted the attention of the nation.1 Although perhaps less well-known among the general public,2 police officers at various times also have stood accused of
using excessive deadly force against Latina/os.3
Immigrants of color also have been subject to abuse by local law
enforcement officers. For example, in 1999, New York City Police
Department officers shot and killed Amadou Diallo, an unarmed immigrant from Guinea, in a hail of bullets; two years earlier, officers literally
tortured Abner Louima, an immigrant from Haiti, in a Brooklyn police
station.4 Both Diallo and Louima were black. Their race undoubtedly

1.

See “Black Lives Matter” Protests, CNN (Oct. 15, 2015, 2:44 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/13/us/gallery/black-lives-matter-protests
[http://perma.cc/N3LF-66QM] (depicting through a slideshow protests of
alleged police abuses of African Americans in New York, Seattle, Chicago,
Oakland, and Washington); L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence:
Lessons From Social Psychology, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2961, 2961 (2015)
(“The recent rash of police killing unarmed black men has brought national
attention to the persistence of policing and racial violence.”); Frances Robles,
A Florida Killing like Many, Disputed and Little Noticed, N.Y. Times (May
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/us/a-florida-police-killinglike-many-disputed-and-little-noticed.html [http://perma.cc/KB4S-MMRY]
(“From Ferguson, Mo., to Baltimore to Cleveland, the nation seems awash in
disputed, high-profile cases of police violence.”).

2.

Some commentators have claimed that the mainstream news media tends
to ignore police brutality directed at Latina/os compared to the widespread
attention paid to that suffered by African Americans. See Nicole Santa Cruz,
Ruben Vives & Marisa Gerber, Why the Deaths of Latinos at the Hands of
Police Haven’t Drawn as Much Attention, L.A. Times (July 18, 2015, 4:00
AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-0718-latino-police-20150718story.html [http://perma.cc/BBE5-MXA4]; Britni Danielle, There’s a Reason
You Haven’t Heard About the “Latino Lives Matter” Movement, TakePart
(Mar. 28, 2015), http://takepart.com/article/2015/03/28/why-you-probablyhavent-heard-about-latino-lives-matter-movement [http://perma.cc/7R2X6RR3].

3.

See, e.g., Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal Construction
of Latino Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 Denv. U. L.
Rev. 1081, 1081–85 (2001) (analyzing the killing of a Latino youth by Phoenix
police officers); Samantha Masunaga, Protests Mount in Northwest Police
Shooting, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 2015, at A18 (reporting on protests in response
to a fatal police shooting of a Mexican immigrant in Pasco, Washington).

4.

See Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47
Buff. L. Rev. 1275, 1284–86 (1999) (recounting police abuse of Diallo and
Louima).
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contributed to the circumstances culminating in their brutal interactions with police. Federal immigration enforcement officers also regularly
find themselves accused of physically abusing Latina/o immigrant—at
times with deadly consequences.5
In less spectacular fashion, police departments across the United
States engage, on a daily basis, in racial profiling in traffic stops.6 African Americans, Latina/os, and other minority groups are profiled by law
enforcement.7 As these descriptions of law enforcement abuse suggest,
the racially disparate consequences of law enforcement are widely considered to be a most serious national criminal justice problem.
Many Americans support heightened immigration controls. Such
support is reflected in the popularity of high removal numbers and symbolized in physical form by the steady lengthening of the wall along the
U.S./Mexico border.8 Mass deportations of “criminal aliens,” who President Obama has referred to with the racially-charged phrase “gang

5.

See Homeland Security Advisory Council, Interim Report of the
CBP Integrity Advisory Council (2015) (documenting, among other
problems, physical abuse of Latina/o and other immigrants by U.S. Customs
and Border Protection officers); Nigel Duara, Border Patrol Agent is Indicted
in Fatal Shooting of Mexican Teen, L.A. Times (Sept. 24, 2015, 3:49 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-border-patrol-agentindicted-20150923-story.html [http://perma.cc/Y3PB-22J3] (reporting on
the indictment of a Border Patrol officer for the murder of a Mexican national
at the U.S./Mexico border); Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the
Border Patrol Became America’s Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement
Agency, Politico (Nov./Dec. 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220#.VQiROGTF880
[http://perma.cc/Y4PJ-9496] (describing violent behavior of some Border
Patrol agents).

6.

See infra Part I.A. (examining the legal decisions in effect authorizing racial
profiling among law enforcement in the United States).

7.

Id.

8.

See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 147 (2012)
(analyzing the political and symbolic significance of the “border wall” between
the United States and Mexico, which has been extended in recent years).
The emergence of Donald Trump as a leading contender for the Republican
nomination for President suggests the general popularity of immigration
enforcement with some segments of the American public. Charging that the
Mexican government sends its nation’s criminals to the United States, Trump
called for expanded border security, extension of the U.S.–Mexico border fence,
and mass deportations of undocumented immigrants. Shortly after making
such extreme claims, Trump surged to the lead of the Republican candidates
in public opinion polls. See Raf Sanchez, Donald Trump Uses Killing of US
Woman by Illegal Immigrant to Justify Mexican “Rapists and Criminals”
Claim, Telegraph (July 6, 2015, 5:21 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/us-election/11721409/Donald-Trump-uses-killing-of-US-womanby-illegal-immigrant-to-justify-Mexican-rapists-and-criminals-claim.html
[http://perma.cc/AD9M-BW3K].
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bangers,9 have served as the cornerstone of the current administration’s
immigration enforcement strategy.10 For a variety of reasons, the targeting of criminal noncitizens for removal has proven to be popular with
the general public. Most notably, public safety concerns arguably weigh
in favor of allocating limited federal immigration enforcement resources
toward efforts to remove noncitizens convicted of crimes from the United States.
The political process often punishes noncitizens with criminal problems. Noncitizens are a particularly vulnerable group in the political
process.11 First off, they lack the right to vote and thus do not possess
formal political power through the ballot box to protect themselves
from punitive measures. As a consequence, immigrants in general have
been subject to discrimination at various times in U.S. history.12
Moreover, immigrants with criminal problems are among the most
disfavored of the generally disfavored group of noncitizens in the political process. Relatively few contemporary immigrant rights advocates expend much political capital seeking to defend immigrants convicted of
crimes in immigration law and policy debates.13 Consequently, the law
and its enforcement over the years has increasingly targeted—some critics might contend consciously punished—noncitizens who have had virtually any brushes with the criminal justice system.14
The Obama administration has strived to prove to the public and
policy-makers its firm commitment to vigorous enforcement of the immigration laws.15 Well-publicized increases in the number of immigrant
removals have been the centerpiece of nothing less than a sustained
political campaign to convince Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform, 16 for which the President has repeatedly expressed

9.

Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes,
Records Show, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html [http://
perma.cc/JEH7-YYSZ] (quoting President Obama).

10.

See infra Part II.

11.

See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The “Huddled Masses” Myth:
Immigration and Civil Rights (2004) (analyzing the history of discrimination against various minority immigrant groups under the U.S. immigration
laws and their enforcement).

12.

Id.

13.

See infra Part III.A.

14.

See infra Part II.

15.

See infra notes 92–99.

16.

See Thompson & Cohen, supra note 9 (exploring deportation for minor crimes
and its importance as a political issue).
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support.17 The conventional wisdom has been that a firm commitment
to aggressive border enforcement will ultimately help to persuade Congress that the time has come to enact immigration reform. The Obama
administration’s dedication to enforcement can be seen in the muchcriticized mass detention and removal of thousands of women and children fleeing widespread violence in Central America in 2014.18
17.

See, e.g., President Obama on Immigration Reform: “I Am Not Going to
Give Up This Fight Until It Gets Done,” White House Blog (Oct. 3, 2014,
4:41 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/10/03/president-obamaimmigration-reform-i-am-not-going-give-fight-until-it-gets-done [http://
perma.cc/P8GR-HPXG] (featuring a video of President Obama speaking on
immigration with a summary of his remarks). Most comprehensive immigration reform proposals would provide some combination of the following:
(1) a path to a durable legal status for certain categories of undocumented
immigrants, often championed as a path to legalization or derided as an
“amnesty”; (2) expanded avenues for lawful immigration to the United States
through, for example, guest worker programs; and (3) bolstered enforcement
of the immigration laws. For a review of various possibilities for immigration
reform, see Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive
Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599 (2009) (outlining
principles that should guide immigration reform); Kevin R. Johnson, Possible
Reforms of the U.S. Immigration Laws, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 315 (2015)
(examining the impact of contemporary immigration laws and exploring
possibilities for reform); see also Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability:
Dismantling the Harms of “Illegality,” 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2015)
(criticizing various legalization proposals based on the claim that they will
increase the vulnerability of noncitizens who are not eligible for relief).

18.

See Flores v. Lynch, No. CV 85-04544 DMG (Ex), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112911 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (denying a motion to reconsider a ruling
that the U.S. government’s immigration detention and other responses to
the 2014 increase in the migration of Central American minors to the United
States violated a consent decree); Scott Rempell, Credible Fears, Unaccompanied Minors, and the Causes of the Southwestern Border Surge, 18 Chap.
L. Rev. 337 (2015) (analyzing the response of the Obama administration to
the increase in the number of Central American women and children coming
to the United States); Margaret H. Taylor & Kit Johnson, “Vast Hordes
. . . Crowding in Upon Us”: The Executive Branch’s Response to Mass
Migration and the Legacy of Chae Chan Ping, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 186, 192–
207 (2015) (analyzing President Obama’s mass detention and rapid immigration processing of Central American women traveling with children);
Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection of Profiteering and
Immigration Detention, Neb. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author) (describing the mass detention of Central
American women and children by the Obama administration); see also Daniel
Kanstroom & Jessica Chicco, The Forgotten Deported: A Declaration on
the Rights of Expelled and Deported Persons, 47 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol.
537, 538 (2015) (“The allure of deportation for governments is apparent,
as it serves many diverse goals, including most obviously extended border
control, interior immigration enforcement, national security, criminal law
enforcement, labor market regulation, and various other forms of social
control.”) (footnote omitted); Marcia Zug, The Mirage of Immigration Reform:
The Devastating Consequences of Obama’s Immigration Policy, 63 Kan. L.
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Not surprisingly, focusing deportation efforts on noncitizens who
encounter a criminal justice system well-known for racial bias has had
racially disparate impacts on the removal of noncitizens from the United States. Specifically, racial profiling in criminal law enforcement—
including but not limited to that widely employed by law enforcement
in the “war on drugs,” combined with removal efforts increasingly directed at noncitizens who have had encounters with the criminal justice
system—has had devastating effects on immigrants of color across the
United States.19 These systems, operating in a coordinated fashion, have
contributed to the fact that today more than 95 percent of the noncitizens removed annually from the United States are from Mexico and
Central America.20 That incredibly high percentage represents a much
larger percentage than the Latina/o composition of the nation’s overall
immigrant—both legal and unauthorized−population.21
Unfortunately, racially discriminatory immigration laws and their
enforcement have a long tradition in the United States. The U.S. government has targeted Latina/o immigrants for presumptive removal
from the country for most of the twentieth century.22 Before that, the
law expressly made immigrants from Asia the primary focus of exclusion and discriminatory enforcement.23 Other immigrant groups at various times in U.S. history have been subject to scorn and harsh treatment through restrictive immigration laws and their enforcement.24
Today’s racially disparate removals of Latina/os are entirely consistent with the widespread popular belief that Mexican immigrants as a
group are predisposed to criminal activity. Well-known public figures,
such as 2016 candidate for the Republican nomination for president
Rev. 953, 953–54 (2015) (examining the punitive nature of the Obama administration’s immigration policies).
19.

See infra Part I.B.2.

20.

See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.

21.

See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs Meets the
Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 967, 976–77 (2015) (citing sources with statistical data
supporting this assertion).

22.

See generally Alfredo Mirandé, Gringo Justice (1987) (analyzing the
history of racial disparities in U.S. immigration enforcement and law enforcement).

23.

See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding
a law allowing for the deportation of Chinese noncitizens); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (rejecting
constitutional challenges to law requiring the exclusion of Chinese noncitizens
from the United States).

24.

See generally Johnson, supra note 11 (analyzing the history of discrimination
against various minority groups under the U.S. immigration laws and their
enforcement).
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Donald Trump and flamboyant conservative political pundit Ann
Coulter, forcefully express these views.25 Such incendiary charges feed
into the widespread presumption that all persons of Mexican ancestry,
U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike, are subject to deportation from the
United States. In contrast to the exaggerated claims that the nation is
being overrun by criminals from foreign lands, social science research
has found time and time again that immigrants—including those from
Mexico and the rest of Latin America—are on average more, not less,
law-abiding than U.S. citizens.26
The growing confluence of criminal law and immigration law
has garnered considerable scholarly attention. The last few years have
seen the emergence of a vibrant body of what has been dubbed
“crimmigration” law scholarship. Generally speaking, this “scholarship describes and critiques the way that immigration and criminal law
interact.” 27 It specifically questions the ever-tightening relationship
25.

See, e.g., Ann Coulter, ¡Adios, America!: The Left’s Plan to Turn
Our Country into a Third World Hellhole (2015) (contending that
Mexican immigrants pose a greater public safety risk to the United States
than Muslim terrorists); Sanchez, supra note 8 (reporting on Donald Trump’s
statements about the criminal propensities of Mexican immigrants). See
generally Romero, supra note 3 (considering the impacts on the law and its
enforcement of the popular stereotype that Latina/os are criminals); Deborah
Weissman, The Politics of Narrative: Law and the Representation of Mexican
Criminality, 38 Fordham Int’l L.J. 141 (2015) (analyzing in detail the
influence of stereotypes of Mexican criminality on American law and policy).

26.

See Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized
Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 624–28 (2015) (observing that the great
weight of empirical data demonstrates the falsity of the recurring claim that
immigrants are particularly prone to criminal activity). For a recent analysis
of the data, which is consistent with a string of previous studies, finding that
immigrants (including Mexican immigrants) are less prone than U.S. citizens
to engage in criminal activity, see Walter A. Ewing, Daniel E. Martínez
& Rubén G. Rumbaut, American Immigration Council, The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States 4–9 (2015), http://
immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/criminalization-immigration-unitedstates [http://perma.cc/V54N-N575].

27.

Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1257,
1260 (2014) (footnote omitted). The growing body of scholarship focusing on
the relationship between criminal law and immigration enforcement includes,
among many articles: Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration,
102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 613 (2012); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New
Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice
Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469 (2007); Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S.
Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 105 (2012); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between
Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. Third
World L.J. 81, 83–86 (2005); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 (2006).
See generally Governing Immigration Through Crime: A Reader (Julie
A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013) (collecting articles analyzing
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between immigration law and criminal law, which results in harsh consequences for immigrants, their families, and the greater community.28
This Article agrees with the fairness critique of crimmigration scholars of the growing link between the criminal justice system and immigration removals. It contends, however, that the criticism has failed to
sufficiently scrutinize the glaringly disparate impacts of tying removals
to alleged criminal activity on immigrants of color. Specifically, the emerging crimmigration scholarship generally fails to analyze in depth the
systematic and institutionalized role of race in modern criminal law
enforcement. Moreover, for the most part the scholarship ignores how
those racial impacts are magnified by the operation of a federal immigration removal process that through a variety of programs targets
“criminal aliens.”29
The general public enthusiastically embraces mass removals of noncitizens with criminal entanglements.30 The truth of the matter is that
the removal of thousands of noncitizens of color who have encountered
the criminal justice system is unlikely to generate significant public
controversy, much less meaningful political resistance. Indeed, the public appears for the most part ready and willing to support the removal
of large numbers of Latina/o immigrants from the United States. The
fact that the group of people most directly affected by the removals are
a discrete and insular political minority—noncitizens of color who
the use of criminal laws to enforce immigration laws). The CrImmigration blog,
managed by Professor César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, provides updates
on developments in the law concerning reliance on the criminal law in immigration enforcement. crImmigration, http://crimmigration.com/ [http://
perma.cc/5UL7-927Y] (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
28.

See Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Crimmigration at the Local Level:
Criminal Justice Processes in the Shadow of Deportation, 49 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 241, 274 (2015) (concluding that changes in immigration enforcement
“appear[] to have transformed the criminal process for non-citizens in state
and local justice systems in ways that enhance the pain associated with
criminal punishment” and that, “[g]iven the large number and growing number
of non-citizen residents of the United States and the unprecedented magnitude
of the U.S. criminal justice system, the impact of immigration law and enforcement on the criminal process can no longer be ignored”).

29.

See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1509,
1531–34 (1995) (analyzing the impact of the negative perception of “criminal
aliens” on American immigration laws and their enforcement); Yolanda
Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigration: Latino Subordination in a “PostRacial” World, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 599, 640–50 (2015) (evaluating the evolution
of the conception of the “criminal alien” under the U.S. immigration laws).
For sustained criticism of the focus of modern removal efforts on “criminal
aliens,” see Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm,
63 UCLA L. Rev. 594 (2016).

30.

See supra text accompanying note 8.
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cannot vote—thus far has tended to dampen political opposition to the
removals.31
Part I of this Article considers parallel developments in the law that
contribute to what can be characterized as the emergence of nothing
less than a Latina/o removal system. It first considers the Supreme
Court’s implicit sanctioning of race-conscious law enforcement in the
United States, with the centerpiece of this symposium, Whren v. United
States,32 perhaps the most well-known example. Second, it summarizes
the trend over the last twenty years toward greatly increased cooperation between state and local law enforcement agencies and federal
immigration enforcement authorities. Part I proceeds to analyze how
and why an increasing number of state and local governments through
what are popularly known as “sanctuary laws” have rejected unrestricted cooperation by law enforcement with federal immigration authorities. Despite the “sanctuary” moniker attached to these laws, effective
policing—even though influenced to a certain extent by sympathy for
the devastating impacts of removals on the lives of immigrants—is the
policy rationale most commonly embraced by local political leaders and
law enforcement officers for these laws and policies.33
Part II demonstrates how local criminal arrests and prosecutions
influenced by police reliance on race inexorably contribute to the racially disparate removal rates experienced in the modern United States. To
their credit, scholars have begun to engage with the racial impacts of
linking removals of immigrants to interactions with the criminal justice
system.34 Yolanda Vásquez, for example, has thoroughly documented

31.

Id.; see infra Part I.B.2.

32.

517 U.S. 806 (1996).

33.

See infra Part I.B.2.

34.

See, e.g., Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. Rev.
75, 89–100 (2013) (contending that the increase in the Asian and Latina/o
populations in the United States transformed the nature of the debate over
immigration reform and making the case for reform of the criminal removal
provisions of the immigration laws); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández,
Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 1457, 1461–67 (acknowledging
the disparate racial impacts of the criminal justice system on modern federal
immigration enforcement); Katarina Ramos, Criminalizing Race in the Name
of Secure Communities, 48 Cal. W. L. Rev. 317, 337–38 (2012) (criticizing
the racial impacts of the operation of the Secure Communities program);
Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis
of Sub-Federal Immigration Laws: The California TRUST Act, 18 Chap.
L. Rev. 481, 492–98 (2015) (criticizing the central role of race in the operation
of the Secure Communities program); Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement and Its Constitutional Dangers, 104 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 227 (2014) (analyzing the increasingly common phenomenon
of state and local law enforcement involvement in federal immigration
enforcement and the resulting negative impacts on minority communities);
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the adverse impacts on Latina/os resulting from the fact that contemporary removals are largely based on the criminal activities of noncitizens; she concludes that the general color-blind approach toward
removing criminals present in U.S. immigration law has undisputable
anti-Latina/o impacts.35 Scholars in disciplines other than law also have
begun to critically assess the devastating impacts of criminal removals
on Latina/os.36
Part III of this Article concludes by contending that law- and
policy-makers should devote greater attention to the racially disparate
impacts of tightly linking removals of immigrants to a racially suspect
criminal justice system.37 It sketches a number of possible reforms—
some that are relatively small and incremental in nature, others more
far-reaching—to the U.S. immigration laws that would tend to blunt,
rather than exacerbate, the anti-Latina/o impacts of the modern American immigration state.38

I.

Racial Profiling and Contemporary Developments
in Crime-Based Removals

This Part of the Article first considers the Supreme Court’s endorsement of racial profiling in ordinary criminal law enforcement and the
enforcement of the immigration laws. Two important decisions operate
together to systematically shape contemporary interactions of law enforcement officers with communities of color across the United States

see also Rebecca A. Hufstader, Note, Immigration Reliance on Gang Databases: Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable Consequences, 90 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 671 (2015) (demonstrating the disparate racial consequences of the
reliance by federal immigration enforcement authorities on state and local
gang databases).
35.

Vázquez, supra note 29.

36.

See, e.g., Tanya Golash-Boza, Deported: Policing Immigrants,
Disposable Labor and Global Capitalism (2015); Tanya Golash-Boza
& Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Latino Immigrant Men and the Deportation
Crisis: A Gendered Racial Removal Program, 11 Latino Stud. 271 (2013)
(exploring the disproportionate targeting of Latino men in U.S. deportations);
Doris Marie Provine & Roxanne Lynn Doty, The Criminalization of Immigrants as a Racial Project, 27 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 261, 261 (2011)
(arguing that contemporary immigration policies “reinforce racialized
anxieties”).

37.

Along similar lines, “[c]riminal law scholars have emphasized race and class
inequality in the criminal justice system yet have not given non-citizen defendants any special analytical attention based on their alienage.” Ingrid V. Eagly,
Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1284–85 (2010) (emphasis
added).

38.

See infra Part III.B.
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and contribute to the fact that removals overwhelmingly fall on Latina/o immigrants.39
Part I next summarizes the movement toward a greater state and
local law enforcement role in federal immigration enforcement. That
development has been fueled in no small part by emerging fears generated by changes brought by the much-publicized growth of the Latina/o
population, even though that growth has slowed in the last few years.40
Antipathy for immigrants and Latina/os also has helped to generate
support for these laws and policies.41 As implemented at the ground
level, enhanced state and local immigration enforcement measures that
feed into the federal removal machinery have had nothing less than
devastating impacts on Latina/o immigrants and U.S. citizens.42
Working together, these parallel developments have helped contribute to a pattern of racially disparate removals of noncitizens from the
United States. Latina/os have specifically borne the brunt of the recordsetting numbers of removals during the Obama presidency.43 The fact
that the immigration removal system results in the removal of noncitizens who are virtually all Latina/o contributes to the perception
among a large number of Americans that the modern U.S. immigration
39.

See infra Part I.A.B.

40.

See, e.g., Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark Hugo Lopez, Hispanic Population
Reaches Record 55 Million, but Growth Has Cooled, Pew Res. Ctr. (June
25, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/25/u-s-hispanicpopulation-growth-surge-cools/ [http://perma.cc/R2FC-HYTC] (providing
information about growth of the Latina/o population in the United States).
The latest research shows that more Mexican citizens are leaving, not migrating to, the United States. See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More Mexicans Leaving
Than Coming to the U.S., Pew Res. Ctr. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.
pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/
[http://perma.cc/F9GZ-4UX2] (noting that ”the overall flow of Mexican
immigrants between the two countries is at its smallest since the 1990s). In
the long run, the changes in immigration may affect the U.S. labor markets.
See Karthick Ramakrishnan, Mexican Migrants are Heading Back Home—
and That’s Bad News for the U.S. Economy, L.A. Times (Nov. 27, 2015, 5:00
AM) http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1127-ramakrishnan-netoutflow-20151127-story.html [http://perma.cc/JZT9-9A9H] (arguing that
“[w]ith the wave of baby boom retirements growing each year, demand for
immigrant workers will only increase”).

41.

See infra text accompanying note 127 (discussing the impact of antipathy
for immigrants and Latina/os on law and policy).

42.

See infra Part I.B.; see also Daniel N. Ramirez & Peter G. Dawson,
“CrImmigration Law” and its Relation to America’s Hispanic Population,
40 T. Marshall L. Rev. 8 Online, no. 3, 2015, at 3 (“[F]oreign national
members of the U.S. Hispanic population face far more severe consequences in
relation to common criminal matters than their U.S. citizen counterparts.”).

43.

See infra text accompanying notes 92–99 (presenting data on the Obama
administration’s removals).
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removal system discriminates, perhaps even intentionally, on the basis
of race.44 One might not expect such an outcome from an administration
led by a president who has expressed a firm commitment to immigration
reform and was elected with the support of the overwhelming majority
of Latina/o voters.45
A.

The Supreme Court’s Authorization of Racial Profiling
in Law Enforcement

In two critically important decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has
encouraged, or, at a minimum, failed to affirmatively discourage, law
enforcement officers’ reliance on race as a core investigatory tool in the
enforcement of both the criminal and immigration laws. These decisions
deeply embed race in modern criminal law enforcement and immigration removal operations in the United States.
At the outset, it is worth mentioning that a glaring divide exists
between the legal and public discourses about the appropriate role of
race in criminal law enforcement. On the one hand, the law, as it has
developed, effectively authorizes race-conscious law enforcement and
imposes sanctions on only the most glaring incidents of racial misconduct.46 On the other hand, although support exists in some quarters for
racial profiling,47 a vocal segment of the public condemns in rather unforgiving fashion police reliance on racial stereotypes in the enforcement
of criminal law.48

44.

See infra Part I.B. (analyzing the relationship between race and the modern
U.S. immigration removal system).

45.

See supra text accompanying notes 15–18.

46.

See infra Part I.A.1–B. (examining the ways in which law enforcement can
discriminate based on race).

47.

Although much criticized, racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims is a popular
component of various governmental measures directed at preventing terrorism.
See, e.g., Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The
Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1185
(2002).

48.

See, e.g., Jesse L. Jackson Sr., Baltimore: We Have Been Here Before,
Philadelphia Trib. (May 1, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/
commentary/baltimore-we-have-been-here-before/article_324427c8-00525c66-945c-5d270a6d5cc4.html [http://perma.cc/B9KL-69U4]. “Before September 11, national polls showed such overwhelming public opposition to racial
profiling that both [former] U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and [former]
President George W. Bush felt compelled to condemn the practice. There
was a strong belief that racial profiling was inefficient, ineffective, and unfair.”
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1576
(2002) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Whren v. United States

In Whren v. United States,49 the landmark 1996 criminal procedure
decision that is the focal point of this symposium, the Supreme Court
held that a stop of a motor vehicle did not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures so long
as the police had probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had
been committed—even if the officers admittedly employed the violation
as a pretext to stop a vehicle because of the race of its occupants.50 The
decision effectively authorized traffic stops by police based on the race
of the occupants of a motor vehicle. It, therefore, contributes to the
prevalence of racial profiling in the modern United States.
The Whren decision “launched a firestorm of virtually unanimous
[academic] criticism.”51 That criticism stems from the fact that the decision in effect authorizes racial profiling in run-of-the-mill traffic stops,
a common modern law-enforcement technique. By many accounts,
racial profiling currently is routine among state and local police in jurisdictions across the United States. 52 It has become an integral tool
49.

517 U.S. 806 (1996); see Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United
States: The Song Remains the Same, in Race Law Stories 419 (Rachel F.
Moran & Devon Carbado eds., 2008) (analyzing the factual background of
the Supreme Court’s decision in, and the impacts of, Whren v. United States).

50.

See Whren, 517 U.S. at 816–19 (“For the run-of-the-mine case, which this
surely is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional commonlaw rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”).

51.

Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the “Would
Have” Test Work?, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 917, 917 (2008); see, e.g., Gabriel J.
Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional Racial Profiling
and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 882, 887 (2015) (“Scholars have been overwhelmingly critical of Whren.”)
(footnote omitted); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the
Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413, 1414 (2013) (criticizing
the marginalization of “the Fourth Amendment’s core value of preventing
arbitrary police behavior”). See generally Devon W. Carbado, [E]Racing the
Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946 (2002) (exploring in detail the
racial dimensions of the modern Supreme Court’s body of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).

52.

Critical analysis of racial profiling in criminal law enforcement is voluminous.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial
Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651 (2002)
(discussing problems with racial profiling by the Maryland State Police);
David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While
Black” Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999) (analyzing data supporting the
claims of racial profiling of African Americans); Tracey Maclin, Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 342 (1998) (arguing that the
current Fourth Amendment framework under Whren “does not stop arbitrary
seizures because it fails to consider that police discretion, police perjury, and
the mutual distrust between blacks and the police are issues intertwined with
the enforcement of traffic stops”); Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling
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employed in the much-maligned, yet nevertheless aggressively enforced,
“war on drugs.”53 Profiling is a well-known component of a criminal
justice system that critics contend is, at bottom, racially biased.54
The Court in Whren v. United States explained in conclusory fashion that any claim of racial discrimination by the police fell outside the
purview of the Fourth Amendment, but is properly brought under the
auspices of the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.55 What the Court wholly failed to acknowledge, however,
is that Equal Protection claims are notoriously difficult to prove and
thus cannot reasonably be relied upon to serve as an effective deterrent
to excessive police reliance on race in traffic stops.56 Indeed, the decision
in Whren serves to create strong, if not almost irresistible, incentives
for police officers to manufacture reasons other than race to justify a
stop—even if race in fact was the true reason for the stop.
Under current Supreme Court precedent, a plaintiff seeking to establish an Equal Protection violation must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the police acted with a discriminatory intent, not
simply that the action, practice, or policy had a discriminatory impact

of African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable
Remedies, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 721 (2004) (identifying existing approaches to
addressing racial profiling and analyzing the various alternatives).
53.

See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law
of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States
and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 Geo. L.J. 1005, 1045–75
(2010) (noting that, despite similar rates of drug use between individuals of
different races, the impact of the “war on drugs” has been particularly devastating in minority communities); see also infra text accompanying notes 70,
99 (analyzing the concerns with the prevalence of racial profiling of Latina/os
by state and local police officers).

54.

See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2010) (documenting the re-emergence
of a caste-like system in the United States resulting from the incarceration
of millions of African Americans, effectively relegating them to a permanent
second-class underclass status in American society); David Cole, No Equal
Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System
(1999); Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (1998); Katheryn
K. Russell, The Color of Crime: Racial Hoaxes, White Fear, Black
Protectionism, Police Harassment, and Other Macroaggressions
(1998).

55.

See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (making that observation and further noting
that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis”).

56.

See infra text accompanying notes 57 and 58 (discussing the difficulty in
proving Equal Protection claims).
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on racial minorities.57 Plaintiffs rarely can produce the evidence necessary to establish a culpable state of mind by state actors; officers generally can easily defeat a charge of discriminatory intent by pointing to a
race-neutral pretext, such as a minor traffic violation, for the stop.58
In any event, even if one is successful in proving an Equal Protection claim, that would not disturb a criminal conviction resulting from
a traffic stop that in reality was based on race. That conviction, in turn,
could well lead to incarceration, and possible removal, of a noncitizen.
2.

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

More than twenty years before it decided Whren v. United States,59
the Supreme Court authorized a form of racial profiling by immigration
enforcement officers making stops in ordinary enforcement operations.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,60 the Court held that race alone
could not serve as the sole basis for an immigration stop of a motor
vehicle under the Fourth Amendment.61 At the same time, however, the
Court stated that “Mexican appearance” could be one factor among
others justifying a stop. In the Court’s words, “[t]he likelihood that any
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
57.

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) (holding that, to prevail
on an Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff must establish a “discriminatory
intent” by a state actor, not simply the disparate impacts of a law, policy, or
practice). For the leading criticism of the discriminatory intent requirement
in modern Equal Protection doctrine, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan.
L. Rev. 317 (1987) (reviewing modern racial discrimination and proposing
a “cultural meaning” test to address such discrimination).

58.

See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (refusing to
find that, despite overwhelming statistical evidence of racially disparate
impacts on African Americans of crack cocaine prosecutions, the plaintiffs had
failed to establish an Equal Protection claim); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 298–99 (1987) (rejecting the Equal Protection claim of an African
American facing the death penalty despite strong evidence of racially
disparate impacts of imposition of the death penalty); Brown v. City of
Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting an Equal Protection challenge
to local police questioning of virtually all African American males (and one
woman) in a small town after a victim reported that the perpetrator of the
crime was black).

59.

517 U.S. 806 (1996).

60.

422 U.S. 873 (1975).

61.

Id. at 885–87; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562–63
(1976) (refusing to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on an
immigration officer’s decision to refer a motor vehicle to secondary inspection
at an immigration checkpoint miles away from the Mexico–United States
border based on the “apparent Mexican ancestry” of the occupants of the
vehicle). The stop in Brignoni-Ponce led to a criminal prosecution for the
knowing transportation of undocumented immigrants. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. at 875.
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Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not
justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.”62
Put differently, the Court in Brignoni-Ponce found that an immigration stop based on “Mexican appearance,” even though that description is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad (i.e., it includes U.S. citizens
and lawful immigrants as well as undocumented ones),63 is permissible
so long as combined with other factors.64 To exacerbate matters, the
Supreme Court has further emphasized that immigration officers can
consider a multitude of factors in immigration stops and emphasized
that courts generally should defer to the officers’ judgment in decisions
to make a stop.65
Commentators have criticized modern racial profiling in immigration enforcement.66 The criticism, however, has not changed the fact
62.

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87.

63.

See Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and
the Mexican-American Experience, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1291–93 (1997)
(noting great variation in physical appearance among persons of Latina/o
ancestry).

64.

See, e.g., United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that Hispanic appearance might be a legitimate factor in an
immigration stop near the Canada–United States border). But see United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(distinguishing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and holding that Hispanic
appearance could not be a factor justifying an immigration stop in the Mexico–
United States border region because significant numbers of persons in the
general population in that part of the country with that general appearance
are U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants).

65.

See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (reversing a
decision finding that a stop violated the Fourth Amendment and stating that
“[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion
determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality
of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a
‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (citation
omitted).

66.

See Johnson, supra note 53, at 1009–45 (analyzing in detail how the Supreme
Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce effectively authorized a form of
racial profiling in immigration enforcement); Sweeney, supra note 34, at 234–
53 (reviewing critically the important role of race in both ordinary law and
immigration enforcement); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Border Exceptionalism in the Era of Moving Borders, 38 Fordham Urb. L.J. 129, 134–53
(2010) (analyzing the expansion of “border exceptionalism” in the application
of the Fourth Amendment and related constitutional doctrines permitting
practices in immigration enforcement that generally are not permitted by
the Constitution in other areas); Christian Briggs, Note, The Reasonableness
of a Race-Based Suspicion: The Fourth Amendment and the Costs and Benefits
of Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 379
(2015) (assessing critically the relative costs and benefits of racial profiling in
immigration enforcement). For criticism of the role of race in immigration
enforcement under modern constitutional doctrine, see Devon W. Carbado &
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that race remains a frequently considered factor in modern immigration
stops.67
As is the case with allegations of racial profiling in traffic stops, an
Equal Protection claim may be brought challenging an immigration
stop for being exclusively based on race. Such a claim, however, is extremely difficult to prove68 and, in any event, would generally not defeat
a removal order. 69 Such claims therefore cannot be expected to serve as
a meaningful deterrent to racial profiling in the enforcement of the
immigration laws.
Courts today routinely rely on Brignoni-Ponce to justify immigration stops in cases in which immigration enforcement officers consider
the “Hispanic appearance” of the occupants of a motor vehicle, so long
as combined with other seemingly race-neutral (and possibly pretextual) factors.70 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Whren and BrignoniPonce together have made it possible for modern law enforcement

Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1543,
1547–48 (2011) (arguing that “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . . . facilitates
both the idea that Latinos are presumptively undocumented . . . and the
practice of detaining Latinos because of that presumption,” and noting that
“for the most part, criminal procedure scholars have not engaged this racial
dynamic”).
67.

Importantly, the exclusionary rule barring admission of evidence secured in
violation of the Fourth Amendment in criminal proceedings does not generally
apply to removal proceedings, which the courts have classified as civil, not
criminal, in nature. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040–50 (1984)
(“In these circumstances, we are persuaded that the . . . balance between
costs and benefits comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil
deportation hearings . . . .”); see also Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration
Police: ICE Prosecutorial Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 113
Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 180 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/policingthe-immigration-police_cade/ [http://perma.cc/9GHN-NPPK] (discussing
the adverse impacts of the Supreme Court’s holding in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza
that, except in egregious circumstances, the exclusionary rule does not apply
to removal proceedings).

68.

See, e.g., infra note 161 (providing an example of an extreme pattern and
practice of racial discrimination violations by local law enforcement agency
in criminal and immigration law enforcement).

69.

See supra text accompanying notes 57 and 58 (illustrating the difficulties in
prevailing on an Equal Protection claim).

70.

See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 675, 696–707 (2000) (reviewing the many
cases permitting the use of “Mexican” and “Hispanic appearance” as one
factor considered by the Border Patrol in an immigration stop); see, e.g.,
United States v. Zapata-Ibarra, 212 F.3d 877, 881–84 (5th Cir. 2000) (looking
at the totality of the circumstances in analyzing the specific facts of the case);
United States v. Telles-Montenegro, No. 8:09-CR-502-T-17TGW, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17259, at *11–20 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2010) (same).

1009

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016
Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination

officers in the United States to rely heavily upon race.71 As a result of
those two decisions, law enforcement agencies frequently employ race
as a central investigatory tool in contemporary criminal and immigration enforcement.72
At the same time, the allegedly impermissible consideration of race
is at the core of many high-profile public controversies over abuses of
authority by law enforcement officers with adverse impacts on racial
minorities.73 Although authorized by law, the public, as well as political
leaders across the ideological spectrum, frequently condemn the use of
racial profiling in ordinary criminal law enforcement.74 Such criticism,
however, is somewhat muted when it comes to reliance on race in immigration enforcement. In that context, the consideration of race is often
treated as normal, natural, and thus justified, with the immigration
status of Latina/os routinely considered to be suspect.75
B.

Increased State and Local Involvement in Immigration Enforcement

Criminal law enforcement and immigration enforcement historically
have operated as separate and independent systems housed in different
parts of the federal, state, and local law enforcement bureaucracies.76

71.

See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, La Migra in the Mirror:
Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 167, 184 (2009) (“The significance
of the language in Brignoni-Ponce—‘Mexican appearance’—and MartinezFuerte—‘of apparent Mexican ancestry’—cannot be overstated.”) (footnote
omitted); Lupe S. Salinas & Fernando Colon-Navarro, Racial Profiling as
a Means of Thwarting the Alleged Latino Security Threat, 37 T. Marshall
L. Rev. 5, 8–17 (2011) (analyzing the adverse impacts of the racial profiling
of Latina/os in law enforcement). See generally Johnson, supra note 53
(identifying the deep and enduring impacts of Whren and Brignoni-Ponce
on encouraging law enforcement reliance on racial profiling as a tool in criminal
and immigration enforcement in the modern United States).

72.

See supra text accompanying note 70 (providing examples of frequent reliance
on race in investigations by law enforcement).

73.

See supra text accompanying note 1 (noting several high-profile examples).

74.

See supra text accompanying notes 51 and 52 (describing the widespread
criticism of racial profiling in law enforcement investigations).

75.

See supra text accompanying notes 22 and 25 (discussing the racial disparities
in U.S. immigration enforcement and the support for these discriminatory
practices in some areas of public discourse).

76.

For analysis of the civil rights implications of state and local police involvement in federal immigration enforcement before the recent increase in state
and local immigration enforcement efforts, see Linda Reyna Yañez & Alfonso
Soto, Local Police Involvement in the Enforcement of Immigration Law, 1
Hisp. L.J. 9, 12 (1994) (arguing that “unguided police action in the immigration field has the potential for infringing on the rights of U.S. citizens,
lawful residents, and aliens”).

1010

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016
Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination

Law enforcement authority traditionally has been distributed in a relatively clear-cut fashion, with those agencies operating for the most part
independently of one another. In the American federalist system, state
and local authorities are the primary enforcers of criminal law. At least
since the late nineteenth century, immigration enforcement has been in
the near-exclusive hands of the federal government.77
Strong law enforcement policy considerations favor the separation
of criminal law and immigration enforcement functions. Few knowledgeable observers disagree that local police agencies are able to most
effectively combat crime when all residents of the community, including
lawful and undocumented immigrants (as well as minority communities
generally), trust the police.78 A relationship of trust appears considerably less likely if immigrants fear possible deportation if they report a
crime to the police, cooperate as witnesses in police investigations, or
otherwise interact with law enforcement officers.79 In addition, palpable
fears of deportation and separation from family, friends, and community, may lead to dangerous—even deadly—situations for police, crime
suspects, and the general public when noncitizens seek to evade or resist
arrest. Consequently, a number of police chiefs of major metropolitan
areas with large immigrant populations have expressed the opinion that
the cooperation of immigrant residents of the community, without fear
of possible removal, is essential to effective criminal law enforcement.80

77.

See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499–500 (2012) (noting the
extensive and complex nature of federal regulation of immigration).

78.

See infra note 80.

79.

See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 604–05 (2008) (offering policy reasons
that cities pass sanctuary laws); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?,
61 SMU L. Rev. 133, 148 (2008) (“With the threat of deportation taken out
of the picture during police and immigrant encounters, police officers have
stated that immigrants are more willing to report crimes.”); Developments
in the Law: Policing, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1706, 1784–85 (2015) (“Latino communities trust police less now that police increasingly perform the functions of
federal immigration officers.”).

80.

See Sandy Fitzgerald, San Francisco County Sheriff Defends Sanctuary Law
After Shooting, Newsmax (July 7, 2015, 9:57 AM), http://www.newsmax.
com/Newsfron/San-Francisco-Ross-Mirkarimi-sheriff-sanctuary/2015/07/07/
id/653782/ [http://perma.cc/3S7U-5A7W] (noting the San Francisco sheriff’s
continuing support for the city’s “sanctuary ordinance” despite a murder
allegedly committed by an undocumented immigrant released under the law);
LAPD’s Special Order 40 on Immigrants Upheld by Court, L.A. Times
(June 17, 2009, 4:51 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/06/
appeals-court-upholds-lapd-policy-on-illegal-immigrants.html [http://perma.
cc/U9YX-M79P] (stating that a series of chiefs of the Los Angeles Police
Department “have said [that Los Angeles Police Department Special Order
40, which limits police inquiry into immigration status (see infra text
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To build trust and cooperation between immigrants and local police, a number of police departments affirmatively prohibit officers from
making general inquiries into the immigration status of crime victims,
witnesses, and others with whom they come into contact. The Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD), not particularly known for being
soft on crime or especially proimmigrant, is a prominent example. In
effect since 1979, LAPD Special Order 40 provides that “officers shall
not initiate police action with the objective of discovering the alien
status of a person.”81 This policy seeks to “increase cooperation between
the undocumented community in Los Angeles and the LAPD, reduce
crime, and produce a better standard of living for both undocumented
immigrants and for the rest of the city’s population.”82
The simple law enforcement rationale behind the LAPD policy, and
similar laws and policies of other localities, is to decrease fear among
immigrants that interactions with police officers might result in possible
removal from the United States. By diminishing fears of removal, these
laws and policies aim to promote the trust of the immigrant community
in law enforcement officers and gain their cooperation with the police
in law enforcement activities.
Some localities further restrict local cooperation with federal immigration authorities in the detention of noncitizens who are arrested for
violation of the criminal laws.83 These laws and policies find support
among law enforcement agencies as another way to build trust and
cooperation among immigrant communities as well as to reduce the
substantial costs of detention.
Despite the legitimate law enforcement aims underlying policies
that limit state and local police cooperation with federal immigration
enforcement, the laws are often referred to generically, and, at least in

accompanying note 81)] . . . encourages undocumented immigrants who
witness crimes to assist police without fear of being deported”).
81.

Special Order No. 40 from LAPD Police Chief Daryl F. Gates (Nov. 27,
1979), www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/SO_40.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EXBCSQE].

82.

Theodore W. Maya, Comment, To Serve and Protect or to Betray and
Neglect?: The LAPD and Undocumented Immigrants, 49 UCLA L. Rev.
1611, 1613 (2002); see Sturgeon v. Bratton, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1407 (2009)
(rejecting legal challenges to Los Angeles Police Department’s Special Order
40). See generally Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C.
Irvine L. Rev. 247, 297–308 (2012) (articulating effective policing and other
policy reasons for the various state and local “sanctuary” laws and policies).

83.

See infra text accompanying notes 110–115(discussing the national controversy
generated by a highly publicized case involving the release of an undocumented
immigrant under the San Francisco “sanctuary ordinance” who later allegedly
committed a murder).
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some quarters, disparagingly, as “sanctuary laws.”84 That moniker contributes to the widely held perception that cities with policies limiting
the extent of cooperation with federal immigration authorities provide
illegitimate refuge to immigrants and thus represent a form of defiance
of the federal immigration laws. The designation of these laws as “sanctuary laws” in effect obfuscates the legitimate law enforcement justifications for the policies.
A number of contemporary developments have eroded the traditional separation of law enforcement and immigration enforcement
authority in the United States and dramatically increased the role of
state and local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration removal. All are designed to bolster immigration enforcement and increase
noncitizen removals. All negatively impact Latina/o immigrants.
1.

Section 287(g) Agreements

Contrary to the long historical practice, recent years have seen a
dramatic increase in direct state and local involvement in the enforcement of the federal immigration laws.85 A major erosion of the wall of
84.

See Villazor, supra note 79, at 148–50, 155–56 (describing the variety of
“sanctuary laws” and the negative connotation of the term “sanctuary”).
For a review of the evolution of state and local “sanctuary” laws, see Stella
Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 703, 735–
43 (2013); see also Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1373, 1388–91 (2006) (summarizing various types of state and local laws
limiting cooperation with federal immigration enforcement authorities);
Natashia Tidwell, Fragmenting the Community: Immigration Enforcement
and the Unintended Consequences of Local Police Non-Cooperation Policies,
88 St. John’s L. Rev. 105 (2014) (examining the consequences of local
policies restricting police cooperation with federal immigration authorities);
Stephanie M. Gomes, Note, Building TRUST in Our Communities: States
Encourage Their Residents to Speak Up in the Wake of the Federal
Government’s Silence, 33 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 715 (2015) (calling for the
reduction of state and local law enforcement involvement in federal immigration enforcement); infra Part I.B.2. (discussing the increase in state and
local government resistance to cooperation with federal immigration enforcement authorities).

85.

See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and
the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 Duke L.J.
1563, 1579–98 (2010) (analyzing various programs that have increased the
cooperation between federal, state, and local governments in immigration
enforcement); Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities after Secure Communities, 91 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 13 (2016) (to a similar effect); Juliet P. Stumpf, D(E)Volving
Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64
Am. U. L. Rev. 1259 (2015) (studying efforts through Secure Communities
and other programs to redistribute immigration enforcement authority from
the federal government to state and local law enforcement agencies); Juliet
P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1557 (2008) (detailing the emergence of state
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separation between state and local criminal law enforcement and federal
immigration enforcement began in earnest with 1996 immigration reforms. Those reforms, designed to bolster enforcement and removals of
“criminal aliens,” included the creation of a new immigration enforcement program pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act Section
287(g).86 Under what are called Section 287(g) agreements entered into
by federal, state, and local governments (many if not most of which the
U.S. government later cancelled), federal immigration authorities provided training in federal immigration law and its enforcement to state
and local police. After receiving that training, state and local law enforcement officers were authorized to affirmatively assist federal immigration authorities in enforcing the nation’s immigration laws.
As part of its overall strategy to bolster immigration enforcement,
the Bush administration entered into many Section 287(g) agreements
with state and local governments.87 Some observers argued that such
agreements resulted in an increase in racial profiling of Latina/os as
state and local law enforcement agencies aggressively sought to facilitate the enforcement of federal immigration law.88
2.

Secure Communities, the Rise of “Sanctuary Cities,” and
the Priority Enforcement Program

Moving away from reliance on Section 287(g) agreements, the
Obama administration opted instead for an efficient alternative known

and local involvement in federal immigration enforcement and the problems
resulting from that development). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The
Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local
Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819 (2011) (assessing
critically the increased state and local government involvement in federal
immigration enforcement).
86.

See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)
(authorizing the Attorney General to “enter into a written agreement with a
State” or locality to permit state or local law enforcement officers to “perform
the function of an immigration officer”).

87.

See Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86
N.C. L. Rev. 1619, 1633–42 (2008) (analyzing a variety of forms of direct
regulation of immigration by state and local governments); Nicholas D.
Michaud, Note, From 287(g) to SB 1070: The Decline of the Federal
Immigration Partnership and the Rise of State-Level Immigration Enforcement, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 1083 (2010) (reviewing the evolution of the § 287(g)
program and contending that deficiencies in its implementation led to the
dramatic increase in state and local immigration enforcement initiatives).

88.

See, e.g., Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law,
49 Ariz. L. Rev. 113, 116 (2007) (“[T]he federal training provided through
the [§ 287(g)] program will not prevent racial profiling by [local law enforcement] officers.”).
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as the “Secure Communities” program.89 Although still relying on state
criminal justice systems to facilitate the removal of criminal noncitizens, that program limited state and local police discretion in immigration enforcement.
Secure Communities required state and local law enforcement agencies to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement authorities.90
State and local police agencies were specifically instructed to share
information with the federal government about noncitizens who were
arrested. They were further required to place immigration “holds” on
(i.e., detain) noncitizens so that federal immigration authorities had the
time necessary, if they so desired, to take custody of the noncitizens for
possible removal.91
Secure Communities facilitated the removals of large numbers of
noncitizens, including both lawful permanent residents and undocumented immigrants, who had been arrested for serious and minor crimes.92
89.

For explanations about the operation of Secure Communities, see Hing, supra
note 82 at 310–11; Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L.
Rev. 149, 207–08 (2013); Ramos, supra note 34, at 319–21; Steven Papazian,
Note, Secure Communities, Sanctuary Laws, and Local Enforcement of
Immigration Law: The Story of Los Angeles, 21 Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 283,
300–04 (2012).

90.

Although initially wavering on the issue, the U.S. government eventually
took the firm position that state and local law enforcement agencies were
required to participate in Secure Communities. Many states and localities
originally had understood that participation in the program was voluntary
in nature. The difference of opinion provoked considerable controversy. See
Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off Our Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual
Defiance of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 101, 105–
11 (2014) (“Without the localities [sic] ability to formally opt-out, governmental and individual voices of resistance emerged.”); see also Trevor George
Gardner, The Promise and Peril of the Anti-Commandeering Rule in the
Homeland Security Era: Immigrant Sanctuary as an Illustrative Case, 34
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 313 (2015) (examining the constitutional
questions raised by the efforts of the U.S. government to mandate state and
local assistance in immigration enforcement).

91.

See supra note 89 (citing authorities explaining the operation of Secure
Communities).

92.

See Editorial, Immigration Bait and Switch, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/opinion/18wed3.html?_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/KCV3-MMS8] (“Immigration and Customs Enforcement records
show that a vast majority, 79 percent, of people deported under Secure
Communities had no criminal records or had been picked up for low-level
offenses, like traffic violations and juvenile mischief.”) (emphasis added);
Kavitha Rajagopalan, Deportation Program Casts Too Wide a Net, Newsday
(New York), June 24, 2011, at A34 (“Secure Communities purports to search
for repeat illegal immigrant offenders or those charged with major crimes.
In practice, most people deported under the program have had no criminal
record at all and were picked up on minor offenses, like speeding.”) (emphasis
added); Thompson & Cohen, supra note 9 (reviewing statistical data on the
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Criminal arrests, not convictions, of noncitizens were the touchstone of
the program. Aggressive implementation of Secure Communities resulted in a spike in removals to record highs of approximately 400,000 noncitizens a year in the first six years of the Obama presidency.93 The
administration widely publicizing the removal records.94 It was much
less well known that almost all of the persons removed from the United
States under Secure Communities were Latina/o.95
Consider the following jarring statistics. Total removals of noncitizens by the U.S. government reached an all-time high of 438,421 in
2013, a jump of at least ten-fold from the total annual removals in the
removal from the United States of many noncitizens arrested for minor
crimes); see also Daniel Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking
Removal, Structuring Proportionality, and Imagining Graduated Sanctions,
30 J.L. & Pol. 465 (2015) (contending, among other things, that the U.S.
government should de-emphasize the removal of long-term lawful permanent
residents).
For critical analysis of the impacts of the Secure Communities program, see
Aarti Kohli, Peter L. Markowitz & Lisa Chavez, Secure Communities by the Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and Due
Process, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social
Policy, UC Berkeley (Oct. 2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf [http://perma.cc/TX39-AYMP];
Rachel R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining Local Government Participation in US Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s “Secure Communities”
Program, 10 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 327, 337–38 (2011).
93.

See, e.g., Brian Bennett, U.S. Deported Record Number of Illegal Immigrants,
L.A. Times (Oct. 6, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/06/nation/
la-na-illegal-immigration-20101007 [http://perma.cc/43PT-Z2CQ] (“Of the
392,862 deportations from October 2009 through September of this year,
about half were illegal immigrants with criminal records. The total was about
3,000 more deportations than the record set in the previous year.”).

94.

See, e.g., Julia Preston, Deportation Up in 2013; Border Sites were Focus,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/us/
deportation-up-in-2013-border-sites-were-focus.html [http://perma.cc/3K6YUHSA] (discussing the U.S. government’s annual report on immigration
enforcement). In publicizing the high numbers of removals, the administration
apparently acted on the belief that demonstrating a commitment to enforcement through increased removals might help convince Congress to pass
comprehensive immigration reform legislation. See supra text accompanying
notes 16 and 17 (“Well-publicized increases in the number of immigrant
removals have been the centerpiece of nothing less than a sustained political
campaign to convince Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform,
for which the President has repeatedly expressed support.”) (citations omitted).

95.

See Ramos, supra note 34, at 328–29 (“[I]f undocumented has come to mean
illegal, then illegal has come to mean Mexican.”); Rosenbaum, supra note 34,
at 495–96 (“From the inception of Secure Communities to approximately 2011,
93% of those identified as removable through Secure Communities were
Latinos, while only 77% of the undocumented population was Latino.”)
(footnotes omitted).
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1990s: “Mexican nationals accounted for 72 percent of all aliens removed. . . . The next leading countries were Guatemala (11 percent),
Honduras (8.3 percent), and El Salvador (4.7 percent). These four countries accounted for 96 percent of all removals.”96 Removals tended to
fall primarily on male noncitizens, who accounted for more than ninety
percent of all persons deported from 2003–13.97 These statistics are entirely consistent with an immigration removal system that targets noncitizens who come into contact with state and local law enforcement
authorities, which in turn target Latino males in criminal law enforcement efforts.98 In essence, “[c]rimmigration has been responsible for the
mass removal of Latinos living in the United States, most significantly
poor Latinos from Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.”99
Moreover, immigrant detentions, which federal law generally requires for many noncitizens convicted of crimes,100 reflect similar racial
disparities. In 2013, “90% of [the immigrants detained] were from just
four Latin-American countries: Mexico (56 percent), Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.”101 In addition, federal criminal immigration
96.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Office of Immigration Statistics,
Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2013 6 (2014) (emphasis added),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_
2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/ST5B-PLYV].

97.

Migration Policy Inst., MPI Report Offers Most Detailed
Analysis Yet of U.S. Deportation System under DHS; Examines
Criminality, Origin, Gender & More of Deportees (2014), http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-report-offers-most-detailed-analysis-yetus-deportation-system-under-dhs-examines [http://perma.cc/SW6Q-T562].
Women immigrants constitute a larger portion of the overall immigrant
population than their percentage of removals. See Llezlie Green Coleman,
Explored at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis of Undocumented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22
Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 397, 400–02 (2015) (discussing “the feminization
of immigration”).

98.

See Vázquez, supra note 29, at 646–47 (“By allowing state and local governments to be the pipeline through which federal immigration law is enforced,
racial bias can manipulate the overall outcomes of those who are removed.”)
(footnote omitted); see also Olivares, supra note 18, at 36–43 (arguing that
the conception that the “immigrant [is] a person of color” has significantly
influenced U.S. government’s immigration enforcement priorities).

99.

Vázquez, supra note 29, at 654 (footnote omitted).

100. See supra text accompanying note 91 (“[State and local police agencies]
were . . . required to place immigration ‘holds’ on (i.e., detain) noncitizens
so that federal immigration authorities had the time necessary, if they so
desired, to take custody of the noncitizens for possible removal.”).
101. Olivares, supra note 18, at 41 (footnote omitted); see Ingrid V. Eagly &
Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court,
164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 46 (Figure 13) (showing that detention rates of noncitizens from Latin America were by far the highest of all countries).
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prosecutions, which have increased dramatically in the last decade, are
overwhelmingly directed at Latina/o immigrants.102
Concerned with the overbroad impacts, negative public safety implications, and the sheer costs of detention of noncitizens for possible
removal by the federal government, some states and localities began to
resist full cooperation with the federal government in immigration enforcement. 103 Over time, increasing numbers of states and localities
passed laws that restrict state and local law enforcement cooperation
with U.S. immigration authorities with respect to the removal of certain
nonserious criminal offenders.104 One commentator observed that
[a] remarkably large number of jurisdictions across the United
States have followed some form of sanctuary policy. Jurisdictions
within the United States that have, or previously had, adopted
some form of sanctuary policy include: Anchorage and Fairbanks,
Alaska; Chandler and Phoenix, Arizona; Fresno, San Diego, the
City and County of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sonoma
County, California; Chicago, Evanston, and Cicero, Illinois; Orleans and Cambridge, Massachusetts; Portland, Maine; Baltimore
and Takoma Park, Maryland; Ann Arbor and Detroit, Michigan;
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Durham, North Carolina; Albuquerque,
102. See Rodolfo D. Saenz, Note, Another Sort of Wall-Building: How
Crimmigration Affects Latino Perceptions of Immigration Law, 28 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 477, 488–89 (2014) (citing statistics demonstrating the disparate
impacts on Latina/os of federal criminal immigration prosecutions); see
also Kit Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Federal Prosecution of
Immigration Crimes, 92 Denv. U. L. Rev. 863 (2015) (analyzing the optimal
level of incarceration for federal immigration crimes).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 104–107 (“Over time, increasing numbers
of states and localities passed laws that restrict state and local law enforcement
cooperation with U.S. immigration authorities with respect to the removal
of certain non-serious criminal offenders.”) (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., California Trust Act, A.B. 4, 2013–2014 Cal. Legis. (Cal. 2013)
(enacted) (limiting state and local law enforcement cooperation with the U.S.
government with respect to noncitizens arrested for minor crimes); Lasch,
supra note 89, at 154–63 (describing the efforts of various localities to resist
participation in the Secure Communities program). For analysis of state and
local resistance to participation in Secure Communities, see Cimini, supra
note 90, at 131–47 (describing methods and legal implications of local
resistance to the obligation of states to comply with federal immigration
detainers); Lasch, supra note 89, at 162–63, 207–16 (describing the purposes
and legal justifications for local resistance to Secure Communities, with a focus
on Santa Clara). An empirical study places in question whether the operation
of Secure Communities in fact hindered state and local law enforcement
efforts. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Legitimacy and Cooperation:
Will Immigrants Cooperate With Local Police who Enforce Federal
Immigration Law? (Close-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
734, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 543, 2015), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658265 [http://perma.cc/FN84-9DSM].
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Aztec, Rio Arriba County, and Santa Fe, New Mexico; Newark,
New Jersey; New York City, New York; Ashland, Gaston, and
Marion County, Oregon; Austin, Houston, and Katy, Texas; Seattle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin.105

State and local resistance to federal immigration enforcement ultimately contributed to the Obama administration’s decision to dismantle Secure Communities. As Department of Homeland Security Secretary
Jeh Johnson candidly explained, the abolition of the “controversial Secure Communities program” responded to “[a] rapidly expanding list of
city, county and state governments” enacting laws that restricted cooperation with federal immigration enforcement.106 The elimination of
Secure Communities was overshadowed in the public eye by the simultaneous announcement of an expanded deferred action program that
provoked a national controversy as well as legal challenges by twentysix states that have indefinitely delayed its implementation.107
When Secure Communities was in operation, the U.S. government
aggressively sought to remove small-time criminal offenders from the
United States as well as noncitizens convicted of more serious criminal
offenses.108 Far from rubber-stamping the U.S. government’s aggressive
removal efforts, a relatively conservative Supreme Court has regularly—and somewhat surprisingly—rejected removal orders that it concluded were inconsistent with the U.S. immigration laws.109
105. Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 Cap.
U. L. Rev. 583, 609–11 (2014) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
106. Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Charles Johnson, U.S.
House of Representatives, Comm. on the Judiciary (July 14, 2015), http://
docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20150714/103734/HHRG-114-JU00Wstate-JohnsonJ-20150714.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SSV-KNDX]; see Michael
Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 Geo.
L.J. 125 (2015) (examining demise of Secure Communities in light of constitutional concerns with the use of criminal law in immigration enforcement).
107. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming a preliminary injunction prohibiting the implementation of an expanded deferred
action program proposed by the Obama administration), cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 906 (2016). For discussion of the legal issues arising from executive
discretion in the deferred action program, see Michael Kagan, A Taxonomy
of Discretion: Refining the Legality Debate About Obama’s Executive Actions
on Immigration, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1083 (2015).
108. See supra text accompanying note 92 (“Secure Communities facilitated the
removals of large numbers of noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents
as well as undocumented immigrants, who had been arrested for minor, as
well as serious, crimes.”) (footnote omitted).
109. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 (2014) (setting aside a
removal order following a drug paraphernalia conviction based on possession
of a sock used to conceal a prescription drug); Moncrieffe v. Holder 133 S.
Ct. 1678 (2013) (same for conviction based on simple possession of a small
amount of marijuana); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566
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In 2015, “sanctuary laws”110 made the national news after the San
Francisco Sheriff’s Office released an undocumented immigrant under
such a law and he allegedly committed murder.111 Originally passed in
1989, the San Francisco “Sanctuary Ordinance,” in relevant part, provides that:
No department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the
City and County of San Francisco shall use any City funds or
resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law
or to gather or disseminate information regarding the immigration
status of individuals in the City and County of San Francisco
unless such assistance is required by federal or State statute, regulation or court decision.112

Pursuant to the ordinance, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office released an undocumented immigrant from Mexico with many criminal
convictions and previous deportations and unlawful re-entries into the
United States; he later was charged with the murder of a woman on the

(prescription drug possession conviction); Lopez v Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47,
50 (2006) (conviction for aiding and abetting possession of drugs); infra text
accompanying notes 141–145, 153–156 (discussing these decisions); see also
Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New
Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 57 (2015)
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions from the 2009–13
Terms and showing that immigrants prevailed in many of the cases).
In addition, the Court, no doubt influenced by a large number of appeals of
removal orders based on criminal convictions, held in the landmark decision
of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359–60 (2010), that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment could be based on defense
counsel’s failure to inform a noncitizen criminal defendant of the possibility
of removal resulting from a criminal conviction under a plea agreement.
110. See supra text accompanying note 77–81 (describing the term “sanctuary laws”).
111. See Jennifer Medina & Julia Preston, After Killing Tied to Deported Felon,
San Francisco Mayor Mulls Policy Shift, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/us/gun-used-in-san-francisco-killing-was-stolenfrom-federal-agent.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7LTC-XY46] (describing the
criticism of San Francisco’s sanctuary ordinance following the alleged murder
of a woman by an undocumented immigrant released from police custody).
112. City and County of S.F. Administrative Code § 12H.2 (1989), http://
sfgov.org/sfc/sanctuary/index_1069_b3ff.html?page=1069 [http://perma.cc/
ZMR7-RZ3K]. For analysis of the San Francisco ordinance, see Pratheepan
Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration
Federalism: A Dialectical Analysis, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1683, 1687–91 (2009).
The ordinance’s restriction of the use of “City funds or resources to assist
in the enforcement of federal immigration law” reflects San Francisco’s budgetary concerns with detaining noncitizens on behalf of the federal government.
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San Francisco waterfront.113 This tragedy attracted national publicity114
and led to calls by members of Congress to pass legislation discouraging
the passage of “sanctuary laws” by state and local governments.115
When the Obama Administration ended Secure Communities in
2014, it simultaneously announced the creation of the “Priority Enforcement Program” (PEP). The stated intent of the new program is to
refocus removal efforts on the most serious criminal immigrant offenders; PEP restricts requests for immigration “holds” to noncitizens actually convicted of serious crimes rather than merely arrested for any
crime.116
Although the new program is more focused than Secure Communities, the racially disparate impacts on removals of the American justice system will almost assuredly continue with the U.S. government’s
reliance on criminal convictions for removals in the new PEP. This
results from the fact that race thoroughly permeates the criminal justice
systems of the federal, state, and local governments, and often plays a
pivotal role in determining who is convicted of, as well as arrested for,
crimes.117
Other federal programs viewed as protecting certain groups of immigrants also have legitimate law enforcement aims. Announced in

113. Medina & Preston, supra note 111.
114. Republican presidential contender Donald Trump made headlines with claims
that the incident supported his view that Mexican immigrants were committing crimes on a massive scale, which in turn required aggressive responses such
as a more secure U.S.–Mexico border and otherwise more rigorous border
enforcement, including mass deportations. See Sanchez, supra note 8 (“Mr.
Trump called the shooting ‘a senseless and totally preventable act of violence
committed by an illegal immigrant’ and said it showed the need for a wall
to be built along the 2,000 mile US-Mexican border.”).
115. Editorial, The Great ‘Sanctuary City’ Slander, N.Y. Times (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/17/opinion/the-great-sanctuary-cityslander.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=BB5B425A79D475469250A02C9C
A97126&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion [http://perma.cc/2KCK-E9CL];
Jordain Carney, Senate Republicans Push to Punish ‘Sanctuary Cities,’
The Hill (July 11, 2015, 4:28 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/
senate/247592-senate-republicans-push-to-punish-sanctuary-cities [http://
perma.cc/C4DW-8GES].
116. Memorandum to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enf’t, Megan Mack, Officer, Office of Civil Rights & Civil
Liberties, Philip A. McNamara, Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental
Affairs, from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec
2–3 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QMK-Q69B].
117. See supra Part I.A. (reviewing developments in criminal removals with
accompanying racial impacts).
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2012, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program118
makes certain undocumented noncitizens without serious criminal
convictions eligible to apply for a type of limited temporary relief from
removal known as “deferred action,” which constitutes a form of
prosecutorial discretion in deciding which noncitizens to target for
removal.119 One of the less intuitive rationales for the program, which
some observers decried as an unlawful “amnesty” of undocumented immigrants, was to promote public safety. The program sought to remove
noncitizens without significant criminal problems from the U.S. government’s removal efforts. The hope, in turn, was to allow the federal government to focus limited immigration enforcement resources on the removal of criminal offenders.120 The expanded deferred action program
proposed by the Obama administration in 2014, which has not yet been
fully implemented, serves similar law enforcement goals.121
3.

State and Local Immigration Enforcement Laws

Responding to the popularity of increased immigration enforcement
as well as growing public frustration with federal enforcement efforts, a
number of state legislatures passed laws ostensibly designed to facilitate
enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws. 122 One of the most well118. See Consideration of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., http://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca [http://
perma.cc/PR4B-3ZFY] (last updated Jan. 4, 2016) (describing DACA).
119. See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of Dream Act Students, 21 Wm. & Mary
Bill Rts. J. 463 (2012) (describing deferred action). See generally Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases (2015) (analyzing the history
of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion through deferred action and other
mechanisms by the U.S. government in American immigration enforcement).
For commentary questioning the scope of discretion exercised by the Obama
administration in its deferred action programs, see Peter Margulies, The
Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence,
and Immigration Law, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1183 (2015).
120. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security,
on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who
Came to the United States as Children 1 (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-cameto-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/8PRB-PGHQ] (stating the necessity
of ensuring that “enforcement resources are not expended” on “low priority
cases”); see also Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 Fordham
L. Rev. 661 (2015) (contending that the Obama administration’s deferred
action programs can be properly understood as adding necessary discretion
to the removal system).
121. See supra text accompanying note 106 and 107.
122. See Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism,
21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 577, 606 (2012) (“[W]ith the explosion of
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known examples is Section 2(B) of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a tough-minded
state immigration enforcement measure that commenced a trend of
similar laws in other states. The law requires local police to verify the
immigration status of persons who they reasonably suspect are in the
United States in violation of the federal immigration laws.123 Little guidance is provided about how state and local police should make that
determination.
Some commentators feared that the implementation of Section 2(B)
would increase the prevalence of racial profiling of Latina/os by state
and local law enforcement officers in the name of immigration enforcement.124 Despite those concerns, the Supreme Court declined to find
that the section on its face was preempted by federal law; consequently,

sub-federal involvement in immigration policing, it seems that states and
localities, in many cases, actually exercise the discretion that definitively
shapes federal enforcement.”); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil
Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 Ga. L. Rev. 609
(2012) (considering the possible adverse civil rights impacts of state and local
immigration enforcement laws). See generally Strange Neighbors: The
Role of States in Immigration Policy (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel
J. Chin eds., 2014) (analyzing from a variety of perspectives the emergence
and impacts of the growing number of state and local immigration enforcement laws).
123. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012) (analyzing the
constitutionality of § 2(B) of S.B. 1070).
124. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling
in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 Wake Forest
J.L. & Pol’y 367, 388–94 (2013) (analyzing how enforcement of § 2(B) in
Arizona has increased racial profiling); Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling
Legalized in Arizona, 1 Colum. J. Race & L. 168, 170 (2012) (explaining
how the enforcement of S.B. 1070 will require racial profiling); Andrea
Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and
Disenfranchisement, 14 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 35, 49–52 (2011) (summarizing
the nature of lawsuits claiming that the full implementation of S.B. 1070
would cause widespread racial profiling and that many people of color would
be subjected to unlawful interrogations, searches, and arrests); David A.
Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and What
S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 Ariz. St. L.J.
523, 525–43 (2011) (analyzing lawsuits brought over S.B. 1070 and racial
profiling); see also Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and
Immigrants’ Rights, 3 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol’y 333, 334 (2013)
(discussing the debate over whether the Supreme Court’s refusal in Arizona
v. United States to invalidate § 2(B) of S.B. 1070 will result in greater racial
profiling of Latina/os); Barbara E. Armacost, Immigration Policing: Federalizing the Local, (Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 2014-60, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2504042 [http://perma.cc/YWJ2-22LW] (contending that the increased role
of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement results
in greater racial profiling of minorities).
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Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 is currently in effect in Arizona.125 A number
of other states have enacted laws with provisions similar to Section
2(B), which courts have upheld.126 In addition to the demand of the
general public for increased enforcement of the federal immigration
laws, antipathy for Latina/os and immigrants contributed to the enactment of the state and local immigration enforcement laws.127
4.

The Modern Criminal Removal System

One commentator aptly summarized the contemporary developments in American immigration enforcement as follows:
[t]he deportation of “criminal aliens” is now the driving force in
American immigration enforcement. In recent years, the Congress, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the White House have all placed criminals front and
center in establishing immigration enforcement priorities . . . .
In effect, federal immigration enforcement has become a criminal
removal system.128
125. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10. The Court left open the possibility of “as
applied” challenges to § 2(B) based on allegedly impermissible discrimination
in individual cases. Id. Despite its refusal to invalidate § 2(B) on its face,
the Court held that three other core provisions of S.B. 1070 were preempted
by federal immigration law. See id. at 2501–07.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1283–85 (11th Cir. 2012)
(upholding a section of the Alabama immigration-enforcement law similar
to § 2(B) of Arizona’s S.B. 1070); see also Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights
v. Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding the same for
a Georgia immigration-enforcement law).
127. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, Anatomy of a
Modern-Day Lynching: The Relationship Between Hate Crimes Against
Latina/os and the Debate over Immigration Reform, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1613,
1628–29 (2013) (summarizing a contentious political campaign, with unquestionably anti-Latina/o and anti-immigrant overtones, culminating in the
passage of a controversial immigration enforcement ordinance by the city of
Hazleton, Pennsylvania). See generally Kristina M. Campbell, A Dry Hate:
White Supremacy and Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric in the Humanitarian Crisis
on the U.S.–Mexico Border, 117 W. Va. L. Rev. 1081 (2015) (analyzing the
history of anti-Latina/o and nativist sentiment in the Southwest border region).
128. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation
in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1128 (2013) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted); see Eagly, supra note 37, at 1281–82 (“The criminal
prosecution of immigration—principally for illegal entry and reentry, alien
smuggling, and document fraud—has reached an all-time high. . . .
Immigration, which now constitutes over half of the federal criminal workload,
has eclipsed all other areas of federal prosecution. Noncitizens have become
the face of federal prisons.”) (footnotes omitted); Developments in the Law,
supra note 79, at 1772 (“What was once a civil-enforcement regime has
developed alongside the modern criminalization, enforcement, and incarceration regime. It is now executed by federal, state, and local officers. It is the
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Concern over the growing Latina/o populations in regions of the
United States that previously had seen relatively little Latina/o migration, including the South and Midwest, significantly fueled the political
efforts toward increased state and local involvement in federal immigration enforcement and the emergence of the full-fledged “criminal removal system” that prevails today.129 As previously discussed,130 police officers routinely rely on race in ordinary criminal law enforcement. With
immigration enforcement today closely tied to state and local criminal
law enforcement activities, removals have fallen overwhelmingly on Latina/o immigrants.131

II. Doubling Down on Race-Based Law Enforcement:
The Modern Criminal Removal State
The racially disparate consequences of the modern criminal justice
system132 contribute to the racially disparate incidence of contemporary
immigration removals.133 Consistent with modern sensibilities and contemporary legal doctrine,134 both systems (but especially the immigration removal system) today are in many respects facially neutral and,
unlike past incarnations of immigration law, do not expressly target
noncitizens of any particular race or nationality. However, both systems
in operation have overwhelmingly negative impacts on Latina/os.135

majority of federal criminal work. It shares the goals of criminal enforcement:
immigration enforcement is used to manage crime, and criminal enforcement
is used to manage immigration.”) (footnotes omitted).
129. See supra text accompanying note 128 (discussing the criminal prosecution
of immigrants).
130. See supra Part I.A. (contending that the decisions in Whren and BrignoniPonce have contributed to law-enforcement officers’ reliance on race).
131. See supra Part I.B.1–3. (analyzing how policy aimed at removing “criminal
aliens” had a disproportionate impact on Latina/o immigrants).
132. See supra Part I. (explaining how the laws and enforcement policies have
created a modern criminal justice system that disproportionately affects
minorities).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 37–48 (highlighting literature that examines the racial impacts of immigration policies).
134. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 Stan.
L. Rev. 1 (1991) (examining how “color-blindness” approach to Equal Protection law contributes to the maintenance of racial inequality).
135. See Mary Fan, Post-Racial Proxy Battles Over Immigration, in Strange
Neighbors, supra note 122, at 229 (contending that state immigration
enforcement laws serve as “a proxy to vent resurgent [racial] anxieties” in
American society). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of ColorBlindness: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the
Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 313
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Through the operation of programs such as Secure Communities
and the Priority Enforcement Program, the criminal justice system
feeds large numbers of noncitizens into the immigration removal machinery. This exacerbates the racially disparate impacts of the criminal
justice system on communities of color, especially Latina/os. 136 The
linkage also has significantly increased the consequences of an interaction of noncitizens—who are disproportionately Latina/o—with the
criminal justice system.137
One cannot deny the racial impacts of the contemporary focus of
removals on noncitizens with criminal problems.138 The challenges, however, by legal scholars and activists to the criminal grounds for removal
and enforcement programs such as Secure Communities, have tended
to focus primarily on the sheer unfairness of large-scale removals of
immigrants for brushes with the law. They do not specifically challenge
the racially disparate consequences of the removal efforts.139 Despite the
fact that Latina/os today constitute the overwhelming number of noncitizens deported, race in immigration removals is not discussed in the
public debate over immigration removals in the same way that it is in
connection with modern criminal law enforcement.140
A number of cases illustrate the racially disparate impacts of allowing criminal law enforcement to feed into immigration enforcement. In
Moncrieffe v. Holder,141 a black immigrant from Jamaica on a short trip
to visit his daughter became caught up in what by all appearances was
a local drug enforcement operation. A traffic stop while he was driving
on an interstate highway in a small Georgia town, and the subsequent
questioning, arrest, and criminal conviction all appear to have been
influenced by the fact that the driver and passenger of the vehicle in

(2012) (analyzing racially disparate impacts of color-blind immigration laws,
such as Arizona’s S.B. 1070, and their enforcement).
136. See supra Part I.B.2.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 96–102 (analyzing disparate impacts
on Latina/os of immigration removals and detention).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 96–102.
139. See, e.g., A Price Too High: US Families Torn Apart by Deportations for
Drug Offenses, Hum. Rts. Watch (June 16, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2015/06/16/price-too-high/us-families-torn-apart-deportations-drugoffenses [http://perma.cc/5VQT-MQGS] (discussing how immigrants are
harshly affected by criminal prosecutions for drug offenses).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 27–31 (noting scholarship addressing
immigration enforcement without focusing on racial issues).
141. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
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question were black males.142 Adrian Moncrieffe was ultimately convicted in Georgia state court for possession of a small amount of marijuana, which has been decriminalized in a growing number of states,
and the U.S. government subsequently sought to remove him from the
United States.143 Finding that Moncrieffe’s removal was not authorized
by the federal immigration statute, the Supreme Court set aside the
removal order.144
Although Moncrieffe v. Holder involved a black man, a significant
number of similar cases involve Latina/os. That directly results from
the fact that law enforcement in many parts of the country target Latina/os for criminal law enforcement activities.145 Enforcement efforts
include racial profiling of Latina/os in ordinary traffic stops, a phenomenon that has been referred to as “driving while brown,” similar to the
much-criticized practice of “driving while black” suffered by African
Americans.146 One observer has noted that Latinos “are especially vulnerable to arrest for minor traffic violations, such as driving without a
license or driving with an expired license.”147 (Until recently, only a few
states allowed undocumented immigrants to be eligible to obtain driver’s licenses.)148 Commentators have observed “that Latinos are stopped for minor traffic violations so that the officers can ascertain the

142. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 984–96 (analyzing evidence that race played
a significant role in Moncrieffe’s interactions with the police and in his
conviction).
143. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1683.
144. Id. at 1693–94.
145. See, e.g., Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 2002) (reversing the
entry of summary judgment in a case involving claim of racial discrimination
against Latina/os by law enforcement officers in a state park). See generally
Lupe S. Salinas, U.S. Latinos and Criminal Injustice 65–85, 107–44
(2015) (analyzing the targeting of Latina/os by state and local law enforcement
agencies).
146. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o
Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 Fla.
L. Rev. 341, 357–63 (2003); see, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d
612 (7th Cir. 2001) (addressing claims of racial profiling brought by Latina/os
and African Americans); Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904
(E.D. Ark. 2010) (addressing racial profiling claims by Latina/os).
147. Alia Al-Khatib, Comment, Putting a Hold on ICE: Why Law Enforcement
Should Refuse to Honor Immigration Detainers, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 109, 161
(2014) (footnote omitted).
148. See Vallerye Mosquera, Vehicle: Driving While Undocumented: Chapter 524
Allows Undocumented Immigrants to Apply for Driver’s Licenses in California, 45 McGeorge L. Rev. 603 (2014) (summarizing the provisions of a
recently enacted California law permitting undocumented immigrants to
be eligible to obtain driver’s licenses).
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driver’s immigration status. Recent data . . . supports the existence
of racial profiling . . . nationwide.”149
In addition, the U.S. government at least initially deployed Secure
Communities150 in predominantly Latina/o communities, instead of all
communities with high crime rates as one would expect if the true aim
of the program was to remove “criminal aliens” of all nationalities from
the United States.151 In light of these facts, it should not be a surprise
that, during the Obama presidency, the vast majority of the persons
removed from the country consistently have been immigrants from
Mexico and Central America, comprising a significantly higher percentage than those groups’ representation in the overall immigrant population in the United States.152
Two relatively recent decisions in which the Supreme Court rejected removal orders involving efforts to deport lawful permanent residents
from Mexico provide a concrete indication of the disparate impacts of
the state and local “war on drugs” on Latina/o immigrants leading to
possible removal. In Lopez v. Gonzales,153 the Supreme Court rejected
the Justice Department’s argument that a lawful resident from Mexico
convicted under state drug law for aiding and abetting another person’s
possession of cocaine was an “aggravated felon”154 under the U.S. immigration laws, requiring mandatory removal.155 Similarly, in Carachuri-

149. Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation”
Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1149, 1188
(2012) (footnote omitted); see Brian Rodriguez, Latinos and the Criminal
Justice System: Overcoming Racial Stigma From Trial to Incarceration,
40 T. Marshall L. Rev. Online 7 (2015) (discussing how officers intentionally pull drivers over who appear to be Latina/o).
150. See supra Part I.B.2. (summarizing the history surrounding the development
of the Secure Communities program).
151. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 87 (2013) (examining data showing crime rates and how Secure
Communities was not initially deployed in areas with high crime rates, but
in areas with large Latina/o populations); see also Thomas J. Miles & Adam
B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure
Communities, 57 J.L. & Econ. 937 (2014) (finding based on the empirical
evidence that Secure Communities failed to reduce crime rates).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 20 and 21.
153. 549 U.S. 47 (2006).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 176–182 (discussing the repeated congressional expansion of the definition of “aggravated felony” in the U.S. immigration
laws that subject noncitizens convicted of such felonies to mandatory detention
and removal and rendering them ineligible for many forms of relief from
removal).
155. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 52.
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Rosendo v. Holder,156 the Court set aside a removal order of a lawful
permanent resident from Mexico who had two minor drug possession
convictions, one for simple possession of a small amount of marijuana
and one for unlawfully possessing a single tablet of a prescription
drug.157 Both cases involved efforts by the Executive Branch to remove
long term lawful residents of the United States from Mexico who were
what can be reasonably characterized as small time drug offenders
caught up in local enforcement of the “war on drugs.”

III. How to Reduce the Racial Disparities in Removals
For the time being, it appears that effective efforts to reduce racial
inequality in criminal and immigration law enforcement will more likely
come from legislative and policy changes than through legal challenges
in the courts. This stems from the fact that the Supreme Court has in
effect authorized racial profiling in both ordinary criminal and immigration enforcement efforts.158 That authorization understandably limits
litigation as an effective tool for deterring reliance on race by law enforcement officers.159 Put differently, existing law makes it extremely
difficult to successfully challenge racially discriminatory law enforcement.160 The limitations on such challenges make litigation likely to put
an end to only the most egregious patterns and practices of racial discrimination.161
In the historical moment in which we live, political action appears
to be the most likely avenue for bringing about reform of immigration
law and its enforcement. Unfortunately, immigration reform efforts
have repeatedly stalled in Congress.162
156. 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
157. Id. at 566.
158. See supra Part I.A. (explaining the Supreme Court decisions in Whren v.
United States and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce).
159. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional
Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for
Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 1109, 1151–54 (explaining
how modern jurisprudence has diminished the constitutional rights of noncitizens); Rosenbaum, supra note 34 at 499–504 (discussing the limitations
on successful legal challenges to racial profiling).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58.
161. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming in
large part an injunction designed to end a pattern and practice of blatant
discrimination against Latina/os by the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office
in Arizona, headed by controversial Sheriff Joe Arpaio, in the name of criminal
and immigration enforcement).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 15–18 (explaining that, despite support
from President Obama, Congress has failed to enact immigration reform).
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This part of the Article first considers political action as a possible
reform strategy and then proceeds to consider changes to the law that
would tend to reduce the racially disparate impacts of the modern immigration removal system.
A.

The Potential of Political Activism

There are indications that political action calling for criminal justice
and immigration reform is a possibility for bringing about change. Political engagement, in recent memory, has significantly influenced immigration legislation and enforcement measures. For example, in 2006,
thousands of people across the United States took to the streets in protest and effectively killed a punitive immigration reform bill passed by
the U.S. House of Representatives.163 The protesters demanded nothing
less than justice for immigrants.
Similarly, the DREAMers, college students brought to this country
as children, advocated for reform of the immigration laws and their
enforcement, have become a powerful national political force.164 Their
activism helped prod the Obama administration to adopt the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals program (known as DACA), which since
2012 has provided limited relief to noncitizens brought to the United
States as children, and to later propose an expanded deferred action
program.165
In addition, state and local resistance, combined with effective advocacy by activists in opposition, to aggressive federal removal efforts
without doubt contributed to the U.S. government’s decision to dismantle the overbroad Secure Communities program. Such efforts also contributed to the U.S. government’s decision to adopt a narrower enforcement strategy directed at noncitizens actually convicted of serious

163. See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights
Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99 (2007) (discussing the multiracial civil rights
movement and its impact on immigration legislation); Sylvia R. Lazos
Vargas, The Immigrant Rights Marches (Las Marchas): Did the “Gigante”
(Giant) Wake Up or Does It Still Sleep Tonight?, 7 Nev. L.J. 780, 812–823
(2007) (explaining the impact of the marches).
164. See Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration Reform, 16 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 79, 85–98 (2013) (recounting the
history of the perennial DREAM Act proposals in Congress); Michael A.
Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the Legislative
Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 Wayne
L. Rev. 1757 (2009) (analyzing the complex politics of the DREAM Act
and immigration reform generally). See generally John Tirman, Dream
Chasers: Immigration and the American Backlash 91–109 (2015)
(discussing the emergence of the DREAMers as a potent force in American
politics).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 118–122 (explaining DACA).
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crimes as opposed to simply being arrested for suspicion of committing
virtually any crime.166
The time might be right for political action to address the racially
disparate impacts of removals. Contemporary public opinion to a certain extent questions the reliance on race in law enforcement.167 Such
sentiment has led to a number of legal and policy pronouncements that
seek to restrict racial profiling in criminal law enforcement.168 Law enforcement goals in addition to racial justice priorities lend support to
such efforts. Namely, racial profiling arguably serves to undermine trust
and cooperation of minority communities with law enforcement169 in
ways similar to how police involvement in immigration enforcement
may deter noncitizen cooperation with police.170
At this point in time, there appears to be little likelihood that the
impacts of race can be removed root and branch from the American
criminal justice system. However, political efforts can and should be
made to attempt to minimize, not maximize, those racial impacts on
the removal of immigrants from the United States.
A handful of relatively modest changes to the U.S. immigration
laws might reduce the impacts on state and local race-conscious law
enforcement on zealous federal removal efforts. 171 In so doing, these
changes would lessen the impacts on Latina/os of the modern removal
system’s reliance on the criminal justice system. More far-reaching reform to the law could bring about even greater reductions in the racial
disparities of immigration enforcement.

166. See supra Part I.B.2. (discussing Secure Communities).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48 (describing public condemnation
of racial profiling).
168. See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. Announces New Rules to Curb Racial
Profiling by Federal Law Enforcement, Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-announcenew-rules-to-curb-racial-profiling-by-federal-law-enforcement/2014/12/07/
e00eca18-7e79-11e4-9f38-95a187e4c1f7_story.html [http://perma.cc/9P5L35EF] (explaining the Obama administration’s new rules for racial profiling
which apply to the Department of Homeland Security).
169. See Harris, supra note 52, at 298–300 (discussing “deep cynicism among
blacks about the fairness and legitimacy of law enforcement and courts” due
to “racially targeted traffic stops”).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 76–84 (stating that, to build trust with
noncitizen communities, some cities prevent law-enforcement officers from
inquiring about immigration status).
171. See supra Part I (discussing contemporary attempts to reform the U.S. immigration law).
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Possible Reforms

This Article does not contend that the removal of noncitizens based
on criminal convictions should be eliminated. Rather, it initially suggests that greater attention be paid to the racial consequences of the
linkage of the contemporary criminal justice and immigration removal
systems. The Article calls for, as a beginning, incremental changes in
law and policy. A few possibilities immediately come to mind.172
As previously discussed,173 drug crimes have a well-recognized relationship to racially biased criminal law enforcement. To make matters
worse for immigrants, the removal provisions based on criminal convictions for drug offenses in the U.S. immigration laws are most unforgiving. 174 One relatively modest reform possibility would be to return
greater discretion to judges in deciding which noncitizens should be
removed from the country for drug convictions and possibly other
crimes. Such discretion generally existed under the law before Congress
passed major enforcement-oriented immigration reforms in 1996, which
made removal, and detention pending removal, mandatory for a great
many noncitizens convicted of criminal, especially drug, offenses.175
172. For possible reforms in addition to those outlined here, see Hum. Rts.
Watch, supra note 139, at 10–11.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21.
174. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(A)(2)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1227
(a)(2)(B) (2012) (making noncitizens convicted for virtually any drug crime
subject to removal from the United States). For critical analysis of the
serious adverse immigration consequences of drug convictions, see Wilber
A. Barillas, Collateral Damage: Drug Enforcement & Its Impact on the
Deportation of Legal Permanent Residents, 34 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 1,
8–19 (2014) (explaining the legislation and rise of drug-based deportations);
Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences
of Criminal Convictions, 6 J. Gender Race & Just. 253, 261 (2002)
(noting that “any drug violation other than a marijuana offense can lead
to deportation of a non-citizen”); see also Jordan Cunnings, Comment,
Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled Pleas and
Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 510 (2015) (analyzing
negative immigration impacts on noncitizens of nonserious marijuana
convictions).
175. See Bill Ong Hing, Re-Examining the Zero-Tolerance Approach to Deporting
Aggravated Felons: Restoring Discretionary Waivers and Developing New
Tools, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 141, 163–74 (2014) (explaining current
trends in detention of noncitizens for drug offenses); Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond
Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S.
Immigration System, 26 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 207, 209–13 (2012) (analyzing
the importance of judicial discretion in removal proceedings); Maritza I.
Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 Temp. L. Rev.
637, 655–70 (2012) (providing a history of judicial discretion in removal
proceedings); Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and Simple Deportation Rules for
Crimes: Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get Them, 92 Denv.

1032

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016
Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination

Legislative reform might also include changes to the immigration
laws that narrow the definition of “aggravated felony.”176 The current
broad definition relegates noncitizens convicted of a plethora of crimes—many of which in fact are neither felonies or particularly serious—
to mandatory detention and removal.177 An aggravated felony conviction also renders noncitizens ineligible for most forms of relief from removal.178 Narrowing the definition would help eliminate some of the
excesses of the modern criminal Latina/o removal machine. To this
point in time, however, Congress has consistently moved in the opposite
direction and has regularly passed increasingly harsh legislation design-

U. L. Rev. 933, 959–61 (2015) (advocating the restoration of judicial
discretion in removal proceedings); see also Jason A. Cade, Return of the
JRAD, N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2669862 [http://perma.cc/X865-VVEJ] (analyzing implications of renowned federal district court Judge Jack Weinstein’s recommendation, without current statutory authorization, that a lawful permanent
resident not be removed from the United States for a criminal conviction).
176. See INA § 101(A)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (defining “aggravated
felony” for purposes of the U.S. immigration laws); see also Sharpless, supra
note 175, at 957–59 (calling for reform of the immigration laws to limit removal
to convictions for crimes for which noncitizen actually served more than five
years in prison); Aaron Lang, Note, An Opportunity for Change? Aggravated
Felonies in Immigration Proceedings and the Effect of Moncrieffe v. Holder,
33 B.U. Int’l L.J. 523, 541–57 (2015) (suggesting possible reforms to
provisions of the immigration laws requiring the removal of noncitizens
convicted of an “aggravated felony”).
177. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (holding that detaining
noncitizens before their removal proceedings did not violate the Fifth Amendment); see also Tom K. Wong, Rights, Deportation, and Detention
in the Age of Immigration Control 119–23 (2015) (summarizing modern
use of detention of immigrants in the United States); César Cuauhtémoc
García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L.
Rev. 1346 (2014) (contending that the modern immigration detention system
is punitive in nature); Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye):
Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication,
91 N.C. L. Rev. 475, 491 (2013) (“[I]mmigration detention during the
pendency of one’s removal proceedings, and even throughout the appeals
process, is a harsh reality.”) (footnote omitted); Mark Noferi, Making Civil
Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil
Detention Paradigm, 27 J. C.R. & Econ. Dev. 533 (2014) (analyzing the
Obama administration’s efforts to reform the immigrant detention system).
Litigation has successfully sought to ensure some judicial review of the
mandatory detention of noncitizens. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d
1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that immigrants in detention must be
afforded individual bond hearings). The anti-Latina/o impacts of immigrant
detention are discussed supra text accompanying notes 100–102.
178. See, e.g., INA § 240a(A)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2012) (providing that
a lawful permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible
for cancellation of removal).
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ed to punish “criminal aliens.” In a series of pieces of legislation, Congress has expanded the definition of an aggravated felony for purposes
of removal:
When Congress first enacted the aggravated felony removal category in 1988, only three serious crimes were included: murder,
drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking. The current list—now
at twenty-eight offenses, some of which create further sub-categories—includes crimes that are neither aggravated nor felonies
under criminal law. Misdemeanor drug possession with a one-year
sentence can qualify as an aggravated felony, as does a year of
probation with a suspended sentence for pulling hair—a misdemeanor under Georgia law. Convictions for selling ten dollars
worth of marijuana, theft of a ten-dollar video game, shoplifting
fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes, and forging a check for less
than twenty dollars have all been held to be aggravated felonies.
Aggravated felonies trigger mandatory detention, deportation
without the possibility of almost all forms of discretionary relief
[from removal], including asylum and cancellation of removal, and
a permanent bar on lawful reentry.179

Because of the adverse consequences of a criminal conviction for an
aggravated felony, the question whether a criminal offense falls into
that category of crimes that are hotly litigated in removal proceedings.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the aggravated felony provisions
under immigration law on numerous occasions in recent years; as we
have seen, immigrants have regularly convinced the Court to set aside
removal orders based on relatively minor drug convictions.180

179. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor
Court, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1751, 1758–59 (2013) (footnotes omitted);
see Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions,
Crime Control and National Security, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1827, 1843–50
(2007) (explaining the broadening classification of “criminal aliens”); see
also Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1651
(2009) (contending that the expansion of criminal removals under the immigration laws has been punitive and that the Constitution should be invoked
to ensure that removals are proportional to the gravity of crimes committed);
Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins & Gabriel J. Chin, A War on Drugs or a War
on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of “Drug Trafficking” in Determining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 Md. L. Rev. 875 (2005)
(criticizing the courts’ expansive interpretation of “aggravated felony” with
respect to drug crimes).
180. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 141–157 (explaining the Supreme
Court’s decisions in criminal removal cases).
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Another minor statutory reform could reduce racial disparities in
immigration enforcement. Immigrant detention, often directed at immigrants convicted of crimes, has adverse impacts on Latina/os.181 Detention, which has been increasingly used as a tool of immigration enforcement,182 could be reduced. To that end, congressional quotas for immigrant detentions might be eliminated. The “bed quotas” require the detention of certain numbers of immigrants and in effect mandate immigration arrests and detentions.183 Elimination of the quotas could reduce
the incentives to overenforce the immigration laws and tend to reduce
detention resulting from racially disparate criminal law enforcement.
The possible reforms suggested above to reduce the racial impacts
of the contemporary removal system are not meant to be exhaustive.
Broader law and policy changes also might serve that end. One could
imagine legislative prohibition of racial profiling, a common practice in
modern criminal and immigration enforcement, which adversely affects
minorities.184 In addition, a return to the historical separation of criminal law and immigration enforcement might reduce the racial disparities
in removals.185
At a more fundamental level, the current racial demographics of
immigration enforcement suggest that the time is right for the United
States to overhaul its immigration system in more far-reaching ways.
Reformers urgently need to advocate that the law be changed to make
it more enforceable and ensure that enforcement is less predisposed
toward noncitizens of color.186 Current law, among other things, has led
to an array of disparate impacts on racial minorities, especially noncitizens from Mexico and Central America, in addition to detention and
181. See supra text accompanying notes 100–103 (discussing the high
percentage of Latina/os detained subject to immigrant detention).
182. See supra text accompanying note 18 (mentioning Obama administration’s
mass detention of Central Americans fleeing violence in 2014).
183. See Roque Planas, Bed Quota Fuels ‘Inhumane’ and ‘Unnecessary’ Immigrant
Detention: Report, Huffington Post (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/15/private-prison-immigrant-detention_
n_7072902.html [http://perma.cc/8JBG-4XZ3] (explaining that private
prisons have lobbied for increased bed quotas); End the Immigration
Detention Bed Quota, Detention Watch Network (Feb. 2014), http://
detentionwatchnetwork.org/EndTheQuotaNarrative [http://perma.cc/8TBTNT2Y] (advocating ending the bed quota).
184. See supra Part I.A. (noting that the Supreme Court decisions generally permit
racial profiling).
185.See supra text accompanying notes 76–80 (observing that criminal law and
immigration enforcement were historically separated).
186. For possibilities for liberalizing admissions under the U.S. immigration laws,
see Kevin R. Johnson, Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs
to Rethink Its Borders and Immigration Laws (2007).
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removals. The law, for example, has led to the creation of an undocumented population of millions of people—a majority of who from Mexico who are presumptively subject to removal—and a racial caste system in the labor market—with undocumented workers, many of whom
are Latina/o, often exploited.

Conclusion
Little attention has been paid to the racially disproportionate impacts of the criminal justice system combined with the contemporary
immigration enforcement focus of the federal government on “criminal
aliens.”187 Nonetheless, examination of the interaction of the two systems demonstrates that the reliance on the federal, state, and local
criminal justice systems in immigration enforcement has glaring racial
impacts. The overwhelming number of noncitizens currently deported
from the United States are from Mexico and Central America.188 The
racially suspect criminal justice system effectively constitutes a Latina/o pipeline into removals, which is often considered to be nothing
more than color-blind enforcement of the immigration laws and adherence to the “rule of law.”
Despite the undisputable racial disparities in modern immigration
enforcement, the dominant critique in the scholarship analyzing the
confluence of criminal law and immigration law focuses primarily on
the unfairness of overbroad removals on noncitizens. 189 This Article
builds on existing scholarship to extend the criticism and to specifically
question the racial impacts of the modern American crimmigration
state. It aims to more directly challenge the racially disparate consequences of excessive reliance on the criminal justice system as the basis
for triggering the removal of noncitizens from the United States.190
Increasing state and local involvement in federal immigration removals has come at a time of considerable public support for immigration enforcement and a general discomfort with the changes brought
about by a growing Latina/o population.191 A palpable dose of antiimmigrant and anti-Latina/o sentiment influences public opinion and
helps buttress support for immigration enforcement.192 Consequently,
removal efforts that have had dramatic impacts on Latina/os thus have

187. See supra text accompanying notes 27–31.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 18–21, 96–102.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29.
190. See supra Parts I–II.
191. See supra Part I.B.
192. See supra text accompanying note 127.
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generally been popular with the public.193 Responding to such concerns,
state and local governments have played increasingly more significant
roles in modern immigration enforcement efforts. Indeed, some states,
most notably Arizona but also Georgia, South Carolina, among others,
have enacted laws that affirmatively require local police to assist federal immigration enforcement.194 Latina/os predominantly have suffered
from the enforcement of those laws.
Relatively minor reforms to U.S. immigration law could begin to
reduce the racial impacts of the reliance on the criminal justice system
for removals.195 This Article has sketched some possible changes to the
law, including legislation narrowing the criminal removal provisions of
the immigration laws and limiting the use of immigration detention as
an enforcement tool.196 Broader changes—such as an outright ban on
racial profiling in criminal and immigration enforcement, a return to
the historical separation of criminal and immigration enforcement, and
reforms that allow for more liberal and realistic immigrant admissions
criteria—would go far to reduce the disparate impacts on Latina/os
that arise from modern immigration enforcement.197
To bring about meaningful law and policy reform, advocates should
build on the public skepticism about race-based law enforcement and
promote reduction of its impacts on removals as a pressing civil rights
necessity, taking the moral high ground away from those who demand
adherence to the rule of law. By so doing, reformers can more effectively
advocate changes to federal immigration and other laws that attempt
to moderate, if not minimize, the disparate racial impacts on removals
resulting from reliance on contemporary criminal law enforcement.198
Nothing less than a new civil rights movement, with racial justice as a
fundamental tenet, can help animate and energize the immigration reform movement.

193. See supra text accompanying note 29.
194. See supra Part I.B.3.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Part II.
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